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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A Court May Affirm the Authority of the Administrative Agency
When Its Decisions Are Not Completely Bereft of Any Competent
Evidentiary Support
The Superior Court of Rhode Island held the Director of the Rhode
Island Department of Business Regulation (Department) neither
exceeded her authority nor erred as a matter of law when she
determined that Blue Cross was in violation of the Small Employer
Health Insurance Availability Act (Act) of Rhode Island.1
Following the amendments to the Act that restricted rating
provisions, Blue Cross continued to use a two-tiered rating
methodology to determine family composition. 2 Blue Cross disputed
that the Act did require a four-tier rating methodology. 3 The
Department determined that the Act required a four-tier rating system,
and issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing requiring
Blue Cross to appear before the Department to show cause why the
Director should not order Blue Cross to cease and desist from violation
of the Act.4 The Director found Blue Cross in violation of the Act and
adopted the sanctions against Blue Cross. 5 Blue Cross moved for a stay
and/or temporary restraining order and contemporaneously filed a
timely administrative appeal.
The court must affirm an agency's decision unless the agency's
findings in support of its decision are completely bereft of any
competent evidentiary support. 7 An administrative agency will be
accorded great deference in interpreting a statute that it administers,
even when the agency's interpretation is not the only permissible
interpretation that could be applied. 8 In the case of statutory ambiguity,
'Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. McConaghy, C.A. No. 01-1570, 2001
RI. Super.
LEXIS 91 at *1 (Super. Ct. R.I. Sept. 5,2001).
2
1d. at *3.
3
41d.

Id.

5
1d.
6

at *4.

at *7.
Blue Cross, 2001 RI. Super. LEXS 91 at *8.
7
d. at *14.
"id.at *15.
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the court must interpret the statute literally and accord the words of the
statute their plain and ordinary meanings, but must not construe a
statute in a way that would result in9 absurdities or would defeat the
underlying purpose of the enactment.
The court held that the legislature intended to stabilize the small
employer health insurance market, including premium rates. 10 They
reasoned that adopting a statutory construction that would leave the
categories of family composition type to a carrier would not enhance
the stabilization of the small employer health insurance market or
relevant premium rates.1 The court therefore held the Director neither
exceeded her authority nor erred as a matter of law in determining that
the act required small employer carriers to use a four-tier rating
methodology
pursuant to the four types of family composition set forth
2
Act.1
the
in
The court denied the appeal and affirmed the decision with respect
to the mandatory use of a four-tier rating system. 13 Blue Cross andBlue
Shield of Rhode Island v. McConaghy, C.A. No. 01-1570, 2001 R.1
Super. LEXIS 91 at *1 (Super. Ct. R.I. Sept. 5, 2001).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
State Statute Banning Physicians From Performing Partial Birth
Procedure Found Unconstitutional
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held
unconstitutional Ohio's statute banning partial birth procedures by
physicians because it prohibited both pre and post-viability
performance of partial birth procedure (PBC) and lacked an adequate
exception allowing the procedure to be performed when it was

9 Blue Cross, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91 at *16-17.
'Old. at *29.
"id. at *29.
2
'13
Id. at *34
Id.
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necessary to preserve the health of the woman, notwithstanding
14
dismissal of claim under civil liability provision of statute.
Plaintiffs, an Ohio corporation presented a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of statute banning PBC before the statute was to come
into effect. 15 Plaintiffs provided medical services including the banned
procedure, and fearing criminal and civil liability for its actions, sued
on its behalf and its affiliated employees and women who received the
procedure. 16 Plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin
defendants, the
7
governor, attorney general, and county prosecutor.'
At the preliminary injunction hearing, plaintiffs requested
preliminary injunctive relief as to the statute, arguing the statute
imposed an undue burden on certain women, lacked an adequate
exception, was unconstitutionally vague, lacked adequate scienter
8
standards, and unconstitutionally permitted third party civil suits.'
The court granted relief 19 Thereafter, a full oral and evidentiary
hearing on plaintiffs request for permanent injunctive and declaratory
relief was held.20
Following the submission of post-hearing
memoranda, the court heard final arguments for permanent injunctive
2
relief. '
Using its prior ruling in a similar case and Supreme Court's ruling
in Carhart,the court addressed the constitutionality of the statute. 2
First, because plaintiffs failed to offer any new law or argument to their
vagueness and scienter standard claims, the statute was not
23
unconstitutionally vague and it contained adequate scienter standards.
Also, although plaintiffs satisfied the criteria of showing an injury in
fact but failed to establish causation and redressability, and as such did
not meet all three criteria for the existence of a case or controversy,
their claim of unconstitutionality to the statute's civil liability provision
14Women's Med. Prof. Corp., et al., v. Taft, et al., No. C-3-00-368, 2001 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15210, at *113-114 (S.D. OH Sept. 20, 2001).
'1Id. at *2.
'61d. at *7.
17Id. at *1.
".1d. at *2.
19Women's
Med. Prof.Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15210, at *4.
2
0

1d.

21

1d.at *5.

2id.
*11-12.
23 d. at
at *19.
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failed.24 Nonetheless, because PBC may provide greater safety for
some women than requiring a physician to induce fetal demise, and
since the statute banned PBC without offering a health exception
covering circumstances in which it is safer than requiring a physician to
induce fetal demise, the statute was unconstitutional 2 5 Furthermore,
because the statute failed to allow a woman to undergo the procedure
when she has a serious physical health problem and the banned
procedure is the safest method of terminating pregnancy, in the postviability context the statute was unconstitutional.2 6 Accordingly, since
the court declared the statute unconstitutional insofar it prohibits pre
and post-viability performance of the procedure, the defendants, their
employees, agents, and servants were permanently enjoined from
enforcing the statute's provisions prohibiting pre and post-viability
performance of the partial birth procedure. 27 Lastly, the court
dismissed plaintiffs' claim under the statute's civil liability provision
because they did not demonstrate the existence of a case or controversy
with defendants.28 Women 's Med. Prof.Corp., et aL, v. Taft, et aL, No.
C-3-00-368, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXS 15210, at *1 (S.D. OH Sept. 20,

2001).
In Order to Prevail in an Eight Amendment Claim A Prisoner
Must Allege in His Complaint that He Has a Serious Medical
Condition and that the State Knowingly Ignores that Condition
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that in order to prevail in an action claiming that he is a victim of
cruel and unusual punishment a prisoner must have a "serious medical
need" and
the corrections staff must have been "deliberately indifferent
29
it."
to

24Women'sMed.Prof.Corp., 2001U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15210, at *101-104, 112.
25Id.
at
26

* 85-86.

1d. at *94-95.

271d.
28

at *113-114.

1d.at *114.

" 9Martin v. Montgomery, No. 00 C 3026, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13927 at *5 (N.D. 111.
Aug 30,2001).
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The plaintiff complained of dental pain, a broken hand, and a lack
of vision care at different times while incarcerated by the Illinois
Department of Corrections.3 ° Plaintiff specifically claimed that the
dental treatment that he received was lacking. 31 Plaintiff further
complained that it took too long for the state to replace the wrong
prescription for his glasses after a correctional officer broke his original
pair.32 Finally, plaintiff complains that when he broke his hand the
technicians to evaluate him, but who
state's physician sent two medical
33
treatment.
said
rendered
never
The plaintiff filed in federal court claiming that he was a victim of
cruel and unusual punishment. 34 The court held that the plaintiff did
35
not sufficiently plead his complaint and dismissed all of his claims.
As to the dental claim, the court reasoned that the plaintiff never
pleaded that the tooth pain hindered his daily activities, and even if he
had, plaintiff never pleaded that the dentist was indifferent to his pain.36
Plaintiffs eye care claim was dismissed because he never asserted that
his eye problem was so severe that he had difficulty functioning
without glasses and that the faulty spectacles supplied to him by the
state did not significantly improve his optical problem. 37 Therefore,
there was no significant medical problem and even if there were the
plaintiff does not allege that the physician was indifferent to his
plight.38 The court also rejected the plaintiffs claim for improper
medical care because he failed to allege that the physician knew that
the technicians had failed to examine his hand and ignored Plaintiffs
condition. 39 Martin v. Montgomery, No. 00 C 3026, 2001 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 13927 at *5 (N.D. i1. Aug 30, 2001).

30
31Martin, 2001
1d. at *2-3.
3
71d. at *3-4.
33

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927 at *2-5.

1d. at *4.

34
35Id. at

*5.

Martin,2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13927 at 10-1 1.
36
1d. at *6-7.
37
1d. at *8.
38
1d. at *8-9.
39
7T-Y- *in
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Inmate Must Demonstrate How the State Was Deliberately
Indifferent to a Serious Medical Need In Order to Succeed In an
Eighth Amendment Claim, and State Department of Corrections Is
Immune From Suit In Federal Court Under the Eleventh
Amendment
The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
Southern Division held: 1) an inmate must demonstrate how the named
defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need to
succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim; and 2) the State Department
of Corrections is immune
from a suit in federal court under the
40
Amendment.
Eleventh
Plaintiff, an inmate at a Michigan correctional facility filed a pro
se complaint alleging the Michigan Department of Corrections and
certain employees failed to protect him from assault.4 1 Plaintiff
asserted a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the claim was analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment.42 A claim under the statute requires an
allegation of a "violation of a right secured43by the federal Constitution
or laws" and must also show a state action.
Another inmate struck plaintiff on the back of the head and he was
rendered unconscious for several minutes while in the recreational
room of the prison.44 Plaintiff attempted to seek medical attention at
the health care center and was stopped by defendant Jones and
instructed to return to the unit.45 Plaintiff S46
proceeded to the health care
center and was taken to the local hospital.
Upon returning to the
prison plaintiff alleges he was placed in "administrative segregation",
forced to stay awake for forty-eight hours, not given his prescribed
medication, and the medication the health center dispensed provided
inadequate pain relief.47 Plaintiff further contended the warden and
40

Smith v. Michigan Department of Corrections, No. 1:01-cv-470, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS4113775 at *6, *12 (W.D. Mich. September 4, 2001).
1d. at *2.
42

1d. at *5.

43

1d.

44
451d.

at *2.
Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775 at 2-3.

46

1d. at *3.

47

1d.
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deputy warden failed to maintain
correction officers monitoring the
48
cameras.
video surveillance
The issue addressed by the court is whether plaintiff alleged
deliberate indifference to his medical condition by the defendants
sufficient enough to state a claim.49 The court concluded that he did
not.50 The court found the warden and deputy warden could not be
sued on the basis of their positions at the prison because there is no
vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983.51 As for the other
defendants, "[t]o act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must
both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety".5 2 Plaintiff in this case failed to show deliberate indifference to
any medical needs on the part of any of the named defendants.53 Nor
was he able to link the denial of medication to the defendants.5 4 A
difference "in judgment between an inmate and prison medical
personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are
not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim., 5 5 As plaintiff failed
to state a federal law claim the court declined to exert supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law tort claims for negligently failing to
protect him from harm. 6
The second issue addressed by the court was whether plaintiff
could assert a §1983 claim against the Michigan Department of
Corrections.57 The court held that he could not because under the
Eleventh Amendment the state and its departments are immune from
suit in federal court unless there has been consent to the suit by the
state or rescission by statute.5 8 As the Department of Corrections had
not waived its immunity against civil rights suits, and there had not
been a statutory revocation of the Eleventh Amendment by Congress,
59
the Michigan Department of Corrections was entitled to immunity.
43

Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LESIS 13775 at *3-4.
1d. at *6.
50
1d. at *7.
Sid.at *10.
52
1d.at *7.
5
'Smith,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775 at *7.
5Id.
55
d. at *7-8.
56
Id. at *12.
57Id.
49

58

59Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775 at *12.

1d. at *13.
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The action was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.6 ° Smith v. Michigan Department of Corrections,No.
1:01-cv-470, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775 (W.D. Mich. September 4,
2001).

CONTRACT
If the Borrowed Servant Doctrine Applies, the State's Workers'
Compensation Act Is the Exclusive Remedy
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
held an employee determined to be a borrowed servant has the state's
Workers' Compensation Act as an exclusive remedy.61
Plaintiff applied and was accepted into the joint Ophthalmology
Residency Program conducted by Louisiana State University (LSU)
School of Medicine and Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation
(Ochsner).62 Several months after commencing the residency, plaintiff
sustained knee and cervical injuries when she fell while exiting an
elevator. 63 The incident occurred on Ochsner's premises. 64 Plaintiffs
65
injuries required surgeries to repair damaged tendons and her spine.
Plaintiff s cross-motion for summary judgment urged the court to
find she was neither an employee or joint-employee of Ochsner nor a
borrowed servant of Ochsner, but an employee solely of LSU, thereby
allowing her tort claim to proceed.66 Defendants argued there was no
genuine issue of material fact, and Ochsner is immune from tort
liability under the state's Workers' Compensation Act.67
The court followed a ten-factor guideline to determine if the
borrowed-servant doctrine applied.68 The ten factors included: (1) right
6°Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775 at *15.
61

Brochner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 99-1725 §T at *33-34 (Sept. 20,

2001)(2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14952).
62
1d. at *4.
63
1d. at *5.
6'Id.
6
_1d. at *6.
66
Brochner,No. 99-1725 §T at *6-7.
67
1d. at *6.
6
11d. at *10.
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of control; (2) selection of employees; (3) payment of wages; (4) power
of dismissal; (5) relinquishment of control by the General Employer;
(6) which employer's work was being performed at the time in
question; (7) agreement, either implicit or explicit, between the
borrowing and lending employer; (8) furnishing of instructions and
place, for performance of the work in question; (9) length of
employment; and (10) acquiescence by the employee in the new work
situation. 69 The court announced these factors are to be weighed as
appropriate in each particular case, no one factor or combination of
factors being determinative.7 °
Applying the ten-factor guideline to plaintiffs claim, the court
found the factors of right of control, relinquishment of control by the
General Employer, which employer's work was being performed at the
time in question, furnishing of instructions and place, for performance
of the work in question, and length of employment, to weigh in favor of
finding plaintiff as a borrowed servant. 7 1 The other factors, the court
announced, weighed equally or were neutral to making a determination
of borrowed servant status. 72 Balancing the two sides, the court
determined the plaintiff to have been acting as a borrowed servant, and
announced that plaintiffs sole remedy, therefore, was under the state's
Workers' Compensation Act.73 The court found it unnecessary to
decide the issue of whether Ochsner was plaintiffs employer or jointemployer. 74 Therefore, plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment
was denied and defendant's was granted on the issue of borrowed
servant status. 75 Brochner v. St. PaulFire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 991725 §T (Sept., 20, 2001)(2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14952).

69

Brochner,No. 99-1725 §T at *10.
1d.at *11.
71
70

1d. at *33-34.

72

1d. at *34.

731Id.

74
75 Brochner,No.

1d.

99-1725 §T at *34.
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Health Maintenance Organization Breached Its Contract With
Hospital When It Unilaterally Imposed Payment Rates From One
Subsidiary Contract to Another Subsidiary Contract
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, held a health maintenance organization, which was
the successor in interest to two separate contracts with a hospital, could
not unilaterally
impose payment rates from one contract onto the
76
other.
Munster Medical Research Foundation (Munster) entered into two
contracts, one with Share Health Plan of Illinois (Share) and one with
MetraHealth Insurance Company (MetraHealth). 77 The Share contract
set forth the terms and applicable rates of Munster's participation in the
Share network.78 The contract only provided rates for emergency
cardiac services. 79 Similarly, MetraHealth had a contract with Munster,
which set forth the conditions of participation in the MetraHealth
network. 80° The MetraHealth contract
set out rates for cardiac services,
81
including non-emergent services.
Subsequent to entering these agreements, Share and MetraHealth
became part of United Health Care of Illinois (UHC). 82 Shortly
thereafter Munster and UHC entered into two amendments, one to each
the Share and MetraHealth agreements. 83 Rates for non-emergent
cardiac services and inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation services
were added to the Share and MetraHealth contracts respectively. 84 Six
months later the contracting representative from UHC wrote to Munster
claiming that the "all payor" clause of the underlying Share contract
allowed UCH to offer the "rates and provisions of the Share agreement
to all payors" and therefore that agreement applies to "all products
76
Munster Medical Research Foundation, Inc. v. United Healthcare of Illinois, Inc., No.
00 C 3611,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14589 at *6 (N.D. Il.September 13, 2001).
77

1rd.
at *1-2.
*2.
1d.
'01d. at *2.
7
11d. at
79

"821Munster, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14589 at *2.
1d.
83

Id.

84

Id. at *3.
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formerly offered by Metrallealth".85 Shortly after that UCH began
86
paying the same rate for all cardiac services performed at Munster.
agreement by this
Munster claimed a breach of the MetraHealth
87
application of the "all payor" clause by UIIC.
The issue before the court was whether the "all payor" clause
extended the rates of the Share agreement for cardiac services to all
UCH health plans. 88 The court held that such a construction of that
provision violated the terms of the MetraHealth agreement.89 The court
reasoned that there were two contracts between the parties, and that
90
each contract contained "its own terms, definitions, duties, and rates".
The court continued, stating the MetraHealth contract made9 1no mention
of the Share plan, nor did it establish the rates for that plan.
Moreover, if the court followed the proposed interpretation of the
"all payor" clause, there would have been a unilateral modification of
the MetraHealth agreement without consideration. 92 The participation
of Munster in the Share network was sufficient consideration only for
the Share contract, and not for the modification providing a rate change
for MetraHealth members. 93 Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment
as to liability was granted, but the motion with respect to damages was
denied. 94 Munster Medical Research Foundation, Inc. v. United
Healthcare of illinois, Inc., No. 00 C 3611, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14589 (N.D. Ill. September 13, 2001).

85

Munster,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14589 at *3-4.

56

1d. at *4.

17Id.

881d.
9

Id.
at *6.

9)Munster,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14599 at *6.
91
id. at *7.
921d. at *8.
93

94Id.

Id. at *10.
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DAMAGES
Objective Medical Evidence Is Required In Order to Prove a
Person Suffered a Serious Injury as Defined Under New York No
Fault Law
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held discograms used to show back injury can constitute objective
95
medical evidence of serious injury under New York No Fault law.
Plaintiffs were injured when their car was struck from the rear by
a United States Postal Service van.96 Plaintiffs presented a variety of
subjective medical evidence based on clinical evaluations of their
complaints of pain.97 Plaintiff Ballantoni also presented results
of a
98
discogram showing abnormality in the L-l/L-2 lumbar regions.
Defendants conceded liability prior to trial, and so the Court ruled
on the issue of damages. 99 Defendants argued results of a discogram
depended on the patient's response to pain and therefore are necessarily
subjective. 10 0 The Court found the first phase of the discogram, relying
on the pain provocation test, subjective. 101 However, the Court found
the second phase of the discogram, CT-scans of the inner structure of
the discs filled with contrast liquid, to be objective evidence
clearly
0 2
regions.1
L-2/L-3
and
L-l/L-2
the
in
showing abnormality
State statute provided a plaintiff may recover for non-economic
loss only if a serious injury was sustained. 10 3 Three categories of
serious injury are applicable under the statute: permanent loss of use of
a body organ, member, function, or system; permanent consequential
limitation of use of a body organ or member; and significant limitation
of use of a body function or system. 10 4 To establish a claim of serious
95Mastrantuono v. United States, No. 99 CIV. 11105, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *31
(S.D.N.Y.
96 Sept. 17,2001).
zd. at *1
97

1d. at *4.
Id. at *30-31.
99Id. at *1.
98

'oMastrantuono,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *29-30.

1011d.
'0 21d. at

*30-31.

'031d. at *25-26.
'I04d. at *25.
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or
injury, a plaintiff must introduce objective evidence of the extent
10 5
injury.
the
from
resulting
limitations
physical
alleged
the
of
degree
Since plaintiff introduced objective evidence of serious back
injury in the form of a discogram, she was eligible for damages for
non-economic loss.'0 6 Mastrantuono v. United States, No. 99 CIV
11105, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXS, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 17, 2001).

EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Employer Not Obliged to Pay for Employee's IME When the
Employee Chose Previous Physician
The Supreme Court of Iowa held an employer has no obligation to pay
for an independent medical examination by a physician the employee
has selected when the employee already obtained, at his employer's
expense, examinations from two physicians that the employee had
chosen.17
Defendant employed plaintiff, an Iowa resident, as a truck
driver.' Plaintiff injured himself in a fall while at work at a Nebraska
plant. 09 Plaintiff went to defendant employer's health services
department where he was told that under Nebraska law a physician of
his choice could treat him.n 0 Plaintiff sought treatment from two
physicians, both of whom said that he had not suffered any permanent
damage as a result of his fall."' Plaintiff petitioned the Iowa industrial
commissioner requesting an independent medical examination at the
employer's expense pursuant to Iowa law.11 2 Defendant refused,
arguing that it had not retained the physicians to whom plaintiff had
The industrial commission concluded that plaintiffs
gone.1 3
1'0 Mastrantuono,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *25-26.
t61d. at *31.
' 0 71BP v. Harker,633 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Iowa 2001).

'O'ld. at 324.
0
91d.
1'd.
2
"113iBP, 633 N.W.2d at 324.

Id.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[

[Vol. 5:133

physicians had been retained by defendant, and therefore,1 14defendant
was obliged to pay for an independent medical examination.
Defendant sought judicial review.' 15 The district court affirmed
the commission's decision holding that defendant retained plaintiffs
physician when it acquiesced 17
to plaintiffs course of medical
6
appealed."
treatment. 11 Defendant
Iowa law allows an employee to receive a medical examination
from a physician of his choice when he believes that a previous8
evaluation made by a physician retained by the employer is too low.1
The dispute is whether the physicians that plaintiff
had gone to were
9
"retained" within the meaning of the statute."
The legislature did not define the term "retained."' 20 The
commissioner had in the past, interpreted "retained" to be synonymous
with "paid.', 121 The court looked at the legislative intent behind the
statute and held that the commission and the district court erred in its
definition of "retained" because the legislature intended to balance the
competing interests of the employer and employee in choosing a
physician. 12 2
The court stated that "paid by employer" is not
synonymous with "retained by employer., 12 3 Because plaintiff chose
the physicians and there was no substantial evidence that defendant
retained the physicians, the court reversed the finding of the
commission and the district court. 124 IBP v. Harker, 633 N. W2d 322,
327 (Iowa 2001).

141BP, 633
5

N.W.2d at 324.

11d.
116Id.

" 71d. at 324.
"'id.at 326.
"9
1BP, 633 N.W.2d at 326.
120ld.
12lid
"

'2Id. at 327.
1LId.

1241BP, 633 N.W.2d at 327.
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EXPERT WITNESS
Testimony By an Expert Witness That the Standard of Care In the
Physician's Community Was the Same As the National Standard
May Be Found Insufficient to Support a Negligence Claim
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section, at Nashville held a
negligence complaint may be properly dismissed for the failure of an
the standard of care in the
expert witness to demonstrate knowledge of
25
community where the physician practiced. 1
Plaintiff injured his ankle when it was caught and twisted between
two railroad ties. 126 Plaintiffs fractured ankle was set and casted by
defendant. 127 Two months after the injury, the cast was removed and
defendant told plaintiff his ankle was fully healed. 128 Plaintiff
complained of pain in the ankle and was examined by another
physician several months later.129 The physician diagnosed postin the ankle, and plaintiff underwent an
traumatic arthritis
130
arthrodesis.
Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting defendant's treatment of his
ankle was negligent.13 ' Pursuant to state statute, plaintiff identified a
medical expert witness who stated he was a licensed orthopedic
physician actively practicing medicine in the state during the year
preceding the injury. 132 At his deposition, the physician testified there
is no differentiation recognized in the medical field between one
locality as opposed to another. 133 Specifically, the physician testified
he considered the national standard of acceptable professional practice
34
to be the same as the recognized standard in Nashville, Tennessee.1

125Robinson v. Lecorps, No. M1999-01581-COA-R3-CV

2001)(2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715).
I6d. at *2.
1271d. at *3.
28Id.
1291d.

13 0Robinson, No. M1999-01581-COA-R3-CV at *3.
1311d. at *3-4.
1321d. at *4.

133 d. at *6.
1341d. at *5.

at *9 (Tenn. Sept. 25,
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Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidentiary
deposition of the physician on grounds that the testimony was based on
a national standard of care rather than a local standard, and was
therefore inadmissible under state statute. 135 The statute placed the
burden of proving negligence on plaintiff by requiring qualified expert
testimony regarding the recognized standard of acceptable professional
practice in the profession and specialty thereof, if any, that the
defendant practices in the community in which he practices or in a
similar community
at the time the alleged injury or wrongful action
136
occurred.

The issue was whether the expert witness possessed knowledge of
the standard of care in the relevant community. 37 The court granted
the motion on the grounds that the physician testified he was basing his
opinion on a national standard of care and therefore, said opinion
standing alone did not meet the requirements of the statute. 138 The
court noted the locality component of the statute expresses a legitimate
state interest in assuring that physicians charged with negligence
receive a fair assessment of their conduct in relation to community
139
standards similar to the community in which they practice.
Therefore, the court dismissed the complaint for the failure of the
expert to demonstrate knowledge of the standard of care in the
community where defendant practiced. 140 Robinson v. Lecorps, No.
M1999-01581-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2001)(2001 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 715).

Neurologist and Internist Were Qualified To Render Expert
Opinions Regarding the Conduct of Surgeon and Anesthesiologists
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held board certified physicians
with specialties in neurology, emergency medicine and internal
medicine would be familiar with and qualified to provide expert
'35Robinson, No. M1999-01581-COA-R3-CV at *7.
136Id. at *10.
1371d. at *21.

13 1d. at *7.
1391d. at *11.
4

t Robinson, No M1999-01581-COA-R3-CV at *7.
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testimony on the physiological
conditions leading to neurological
14
breakdown and stroke. 1
In 1994, decedent fell and severely injured her elbow, and
required corrective surgery. 142 She had a past medical history that
included heart problems, hypertension, and diabetes and was on several
medications. 143 Several tests were administered to decedent and there
144
was evidence that she suffered from congestive heart failure.
Decedent had requested general anesthesia for her surgery. 14 5 After the
administration of the anesthesia, decedent's health deteriorated and it
was determined that she suffered from 1a47stroke. 146 Nine days later, she
died from complications of that stroke.
The administrator of the decedent's estate filed a complaint
against the physicians, the anesthesia group, the health system, and the
hospital alleging negligence. 148
During the discovery process,
defendants filed motions to compel expert reports. 149 Plaintiff provided
the expert reports by a physician who is a neurologist and psychologist,
150
and a physician who was an internist and emergency physician.
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment alleging that the
expert reports provided an insufficient basis upon which to predicate a
prima facie
case. 151
The motions were granted and plaintiff
52
1
appealed.
The state law standard for qualification as an expert witness was a
liberal one. 153 The test that the court applied considered whether the
witness had any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge in the

141 Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, M.D., No. 1982 WDA 2000, 2001 WL 1041847, at *4

(Pa.Super.
11, 2001).
1421d.Sept
at * 1.
4

1 31d.

14Id.

1451d.
'4 6Rauch, 2001 WL 1041847 at *2.
147Id.

148Id

IsoId.
'-"Rauch,
2001 WL 1041847 at *2.
5
tId.

'-'31d.

at *3.
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54
If they possess such knowledge, he or she
field under investigation..
55

may testify.1

The Court determined that the expert reports in this case were
provided by physicians experienced and knowledgeable in the subject
under investigation. 156 The court could find no reason to preclude the
expert reports offered by plaintiff on he basis that the physicians were
unqualified to offer expert opinions.1 5 7 The court concluded that the
trial court erred in granting the summary judgment motions. 158 Rauch v.
Mike-Mayer, MD., No. 1982 WDA 2000, 2001 WL 1041847, at *4
(Pa.Super.Sept. 11, 2001).

JURY
Where the Liability of Physician and a Hospital Are Separate and
Distinct, There is No Unity of Interest Between the Two For
Purposes of Peremptory Challenges.
The Appellate Court of Connecticut held defendant physician's alleged
negligence and defendant hospital's alleged negligence differed in that
the liability of each was separate and distinct from the other and
therefore, there was no unity of interest between the two defendants for
challenges each
the purposes of determining the number of peremptory
1 59
jury.
the
of
selection
the
in
receive
would
defendant
Plaintiff was born prematurely at the defendant hospital. 160 An
intravenous catheter was inserted in plaintiff.16' Plaintiff suffered poor
blood flow to her hand and the nurses tried several treatments that did
not improve her condition.162 Defendant physician arrived after several
'554Rauch, 2001 WL 1041847 at *3.

151d.
'561d. at *4.
157
1d.
158
1d.
159Marshall v. Hartford Hospital, No. 20345, 2001 WL 1092831, at *6 (Conn. App.
Sept. 25,602001).
1 1d, at *1.
161id.
'62Id at

*2.
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hours and ordered a nitroglycerin paste for plaintiffs hand. 163 The
order was not carried out until three hours later and was not
were attempted and plaintiffs rightsuccessful. 164 No other treatments
165
hand fingers were amputated.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant hospital and
defendant physician alleging defendants were negligent in diagnosing
and treating her complications.' 66 Prior to trial, the court ruled that
defendant physician and defendant hospital had no unity of interest
between them and consequently allowed each defendant four
peremptory challenges. 167 The court directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant physician at the end of plaintiffs case. 168 At the conclusion
of the entire case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant
hospital that the court refused to set aside. 169 Plaintiff argued that the
court erred in restricting her to four peremptory challenges while
defendants eight total, resulting in a verdict in defendant's
allowing
70
favor.1
State law allows the court to give each party bound by unity of
interest to another party, individual or combined peremptory challenges
at the court's discretion. 171 Those parties that have no unity of interest
must receive the allowable number of individual statutory peremptory
challenges. 172 The primary test to determine unity of interest is
whether there are separate issues of the court determined that the'
hospital's potential negligence arose out of the actions of its nurses and
1 73
employees that occurred before defendant arrived at the scene.
Defendant physician and defendant hospital employees were not
involved in each other's negligence. 174 The liability of each of
defendants was separate and distinct, therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing each defendant four peremptory
163 Marshall,2001 WL 109283 1, at *2.
164d.
1651d.
66

' 1d. at *1.

'671d. at *2.
168Marshall,2001 WL 1092831, at *1.

1691d.

170Id. at *3.
1711d. at *6.
172d.
'73
Marshall,2001 WL 1092831, at *7.
74
1 1d.
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challenges. 175 Marshall v. Hartford Hospital, No. 20345, 2001 Wf
1092831,76 at *6 (Conn. App. Sept. 25, 2001).liability as to the two
parties.1

MALPRACTICE
Joint Enterprise Theory of Liability Between Hospital and
Radiological Service Not Evident When Four Elements of Theory
Not Met
The Court of Appeals of Texas held the hospital vicariously liable by
imputing physician of contracted radiological services provider to
service and in turn imputing contracted radiological services provider
to hospital under theory of joint enterprise is not resultant when the
element of community of pecuniary interest is not met, even though
other elements including agreement among members
of the group and
17 7
met.
are
group
the
by
out
carried
common purpose
Plaintiff sustained injuries to her head, neck, and torso as a result
of an automobile accident. 17 8 She was transported by ambulance to
initial medical center, and upon x-ray procedure, emergency room
179
physician discharged patient with diagnosis of strain and contusion.
The following day, radiological services physician reviewed x-rays,
finding no fractures.1 80
As instructed by radiological services
physician, plaintiff visited her primary care physician, but developed
worsening symptoms. 181 Several weeks later, plaintiff went to a second
hospital emergency room, had further x-rays reviewed by another
radiologist, and was released with pain medications and
recommendation to follow-up with her primary care physician. 182 With
'75
Marshall,2001
7
1 6Id.

WL 1092831, at *7.

177Blackburn v. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Arlington, No. 2-00-426-CV, 2001 LEXIS 6514
at *1 (Tex. App. Sept. 27, 2001).
1711d. at *2.
179Id. at *3.
'1old.
'1 d. at *3-4.
82
' Blackburn, 2001 LEXIS 6514 at *4.
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her condition worsening, plaintiff had x-rays done by a chiropractor
who discovered a fracture
in her vertebra.'8 3 Subsequently, corrective
84
'
surgery was performed.
Plaintiff sued initial medical center, radiological services provider
physician, second hospital and second radiologists, claiming negligence
by initial radiological services provider physician, and under a theory
of partner, employee, or principal liability imputed radiological
services provider.1 5 Against initial hospital, plaintiff advanced a
theory of joint enterprise between it and radiological services provider
through the actions of radiological services provider physician's
actions. 186 The same allegations under the same theory were made
against second hospital and second radiologist, and radiological
services provider of that hospital. 8 7 Defendant, initial hospital, filed
both a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and a traditional
summary judgment motion 88 Defendant contended plaintiff presented
no evidence of any elements to her claim ofjoint enterprise liability. 89
Plaintiff responded by arguing her evidence established negligence to
initial radiological services provider physician, and that initial hospital
and radiological services provider were in a joint enterprise, with
radiologist acting as agent of hospital. 190 The trial court granted both
motions in favor of defendant. 191 Plaintiff appealed, arguing that since
defendant failed to negate the existence of a joint enterprise with
services provider as a matter of law, summary judgment should not
have been granted, and that summary judgment evidence raised
genuine issues
of material fact as to each of the four elements of joint
192
enterprise.
Although the evidence demonstrated an express agreement
between the defendant and radiological services provider, and a
common purpose, the evidence did not show a community of pecuniary
183 Blackburn, 2001

LEXIS 6514 at *5.

'4Id.
"51d. at

*6.

8
1 7.1d.

' Blackburn, 2001 LEXIS 6514 at *7.

1891d.
"'°Id. at *8-9.
'911d. at *9.
'9Id. at *9-10.
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interest. 193 Since plaintiff failed to show more than a scintilla of
evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
existence of a community of pecuniary interest between defendant and
provider, and defendant conclusively disproved that essential element,
the trial court properly granted both summary judgment motions in
favor of defendant. 194 Trial court's judgment affirmed.' 95 Blackburn v.
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Arlington, No. 2-00-426-CV, 2001 LE=S 6514,
at *1 (Tex. App. Sept. 27, 2001).

A Telephone Consultation Does Not Create a Duty Under the
Physician Patient Relationship
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that telephone consultations
do not
1 96
constitute the creation of a physician patient relationship.
When Ashley Irvin (Patient) was six months old she required a
ventriculoperitoneal shunt to be surgically inserted. 197 At age twelve,
Patient was experiencing flu like symptoms and seizures. 19 8 Dr.
Divelbiss examined the x-rays and concluded that there was nothing
wrong with the shunt. 199 Patient was then discharged. a 0 Patient
continued to suffer from nausea, neck pain, and seizures for several
months. 20 1 Then, Dr. Smith, Patient's primary care physician, called
Dr. Gilmarten, a pediatric neurologist, for a consultation.20 2 Both
agreed that a shuntogram should be performed to determine whether
there were any blockages in the shunt.20 3 However, before any tests
could be performed, the patient's status deteriorated and she suffered
brain damage due to the shunt being obstructed.20 4 Patient is now
'3 Blackburn, 2001
' 941d. at *37-38.
95
'96
1d. at *38.

LEXIS 6514 at *18-20, 37.

1 Irvin v. Smith, No. 85,063, 2001 Kan. LEXIS 595 at *23 (Kan. Sept. 21, 2001).
' 9 71d. at *4.
9
"'
Id. at *5.
'20991d. at *6.
0
1d.
2 01
Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241 at *7.
202Id.
2 03
1d. at *9.
2

04Id.
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unable05 to walk or speak, is incontinent, and requires around the clock
care.

2

Patient's parents (plaintiffs) filed suit in Kansas state court on her
behalf 206 Gilmartin moved for summary judgment claiming that he did
not owe a duty to the patient because there was no physician patient
relationship. 0 7 The district court granted Gilmartin's motion.20 8
claiming that a physician
Plaintiffs appealed the district
20 9 courts ruling
patient relationship did exist.
The court held that a physician-patient relationship occurs only
when the physician personally examines a patient. 210 The court
affirmed the district courts ruling.211 The court reasoned that public
policy favors physicians the seeking out and counseling with other
v.
physicians in order to provide the best care to a patient. 212 Iri
Smith, No. 85,063, 2001 Kan. LEXIS 595 at *23 (Kan. Sept. 21, 2001).

NEGLIGENCE
Duty of Care Exists Between Physician and the Pregnant Patient
and Her Fetus.
The Supreme Court of Kansas held a physician-patient relationship
exists between a physician and the fetus of a patient who intends to
carry the fetus to term and deliver a healthy baby. 13 The court also
held that a pregnant woman is entitled to be notified when she has
tested positive for a communicable disease that can be transmitted to
her baby during labor and delivery.214

Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241 at *10.

205

20 6
1d.
207

1d.

209

1d.
Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241 at *16.

230
2 1

°2Id. at *22.
21

1d. at *23.
Nold v. Binyon, et al., 31 P.3d 274, 289 (Kan. 2001).
1d.

2 13

214
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Plaintiffs mother was tested for hepatitis B early on in her
pregnancy with plaintiff 215 Although the mother tested positive, she
was never informed of the results of the test. 16 During her pregnancy,
the mother changed physicians and her medical records were sent to her
new physician, who noted the hepatitis B information on the mother's
chart but never informed her of it.2 17 The mother's medical records
218
were sent to the hospital during the final weeks of her pregnancy.
The mother went through labor and delivery without knowing her
hepatitis B status.2 1 9 Plaintiff did not receive the necessary treatment
after her birth that would have protected her from becoming positive
for hepatitis B.220 The mother and plaintiff were not informed that they
were positive for hepatitis B until two years after the plaintiff s birth.21
Plaintiffs parents filed this action on her behalf.222 They alleged
that the hospital and certain physicians were negligent in their care of
the mother and plaintiff.223 At trial, a jury returned a favorable verdict
for plaintiff, and awarded her $800,000.00.224 The jury apportioned the
negligence among several physicians and dismissed the hospital on its
motion for judgment as a matter of law.225 Plaintiff presented expert
testimony against the hospital, which was excluded by the court in
response to the hospital's motion in limine.226 Defendant physicians
appealed contending that the district court erred in its exclusion of the
testimony of plaintiffs expert.2 2 7 Defendants
also argue that Jury
228
Instruction No. 15 was overbroad in its scope.
The court first addressed the issue of the exclusion of the
testimony by plaintiffs expert witness. 229 State law requires expert
21 5

Nold, 31 P.3d at 278.

2 16

217

1d.

1d. at 279.

21Id. at 280.
219
1d"
220
Nold, 31 P.3d at 281.
22 1
1d"

2221d. at 276.

mId. at 276.
2241d. at 277.
5
22
226 Nold, 31 P.3d at 277.
1d at 281.
227Id.
22

'1d. at 285.

229Id. at 281.
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witnesses' opinions to be based on facts or data perceived or personally
known or made known to the witness at the time of the hearing, and
within the scope of the witness' knowledge, skill, experience or
training. 23
The second issue the court addressed was the jury
instruction that defendants argued was in error because of the
overbroad scope of the duty owed to plaintiff, and because it failed to
factor in expert testimony to establish negligence. 23 1 The court looked
at other jurisdictions and their findings that as a matter of law, a
relationship exists between the physician and a pregnant woman and
her fetus. 232 The law requires that in a medical malpractice case
plaintiff bears the burden of showing the physician's negligence and
that the negligence caused the injury.233 The court stated
that proving
234
negligence usually requires expert medical testimony.
The court ruled that the district court erred in its exclusion of the
testimony by plaintiffs expert because the witness' knowledge and
experience qualified him to testify regarding the hospital's nursing
standards and their breach.235 The court refused to affirm the jury
instruction as written with its relaxation of the expert testimony
requirement. 2336 However, the court affirmed the part of the jury
instruction that established a physician-patient relationship with the
fetus of a pregnant patient and the requirement that a pregnant patient
be informed if it is discovered that she has a communicable disease that
can be transferred to her fetus. 37 The case was remanded to district
court. 238 Nold v. Binyon, et aL, 31 P.3d274, 289 (Kan. 2001).

2
2 Nold, 31 P.3d at 281-282.

3aId at 285.
at 286.

232d.
23

' 4Id. at 285.
2
2

Id.

5Nold, 31 P.3d at 284.

6
23 1d. at
2
3aId.
at 289.
3

285.

2 1d.
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Claims Grounded In Violations of Illinois Nursing Home Care Act
Do Not Require Compliance With Mandates of 735 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/2-622
The Court of Appeals of Illinois held although an action for negligence
by a nursing home brought under Nursing Home Care Act (NIA)
conflicted with 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-622, the NHA was more
specifically applicable to the facts and controlled, thereby precluding
the requirement
of filing a section 2-622 expert certificate and written
39
report.

2

Plaintiff, former resident of nursing home, sued nursing home for
falling and fracturing hip while attempting to use bathroom, alleging
numerous causes of action including breach of contract and fiduciary
duty, res ipsa loquitor, and violations of NHA.2 40 Defendant nursing
home filed motion to dismiss, and trial court granted, finding plaintiff
improperly mixed causes of action but allowed plaintiff leave to
replead. 241 Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging
only negligence under NHA by failing to adequately supervise her
activity, ensure that she did not walk without assistant, respond to her
call light when requested, equip her bed with a pressure release, and
242
adequately staff the facility to ensure appropriate assistance.
Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss because plaintiff's claim
sounded in "healing art practice," which would be mandated by 2622.
As such, the complaint would require filing an accompanying
affidavit and written physician report, which she had not submitted. 2 "
Trial court again granted defendant's motion, but also gave plaintiff
245 Plaintiff sought interlocutory review, appealing to
leave to replead.
24 6
supreme court.

239Eads v..Heritage Enters., Inc. et at., No. 4-99-0954, 2001 LEXIS 753 at *1 (111. App.

Sept. 26, 2001).
240
1d. at *1-2.
24 1
1d. at *2.
2421d. at *2-3.
243

1d. at *3.
244Eads, 2001 LEXIS 753 at *3.
245
246Id. at *4.

Id.
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Because NHA only pertains to cases arising from nursing home
care, under the traditional approach it controlled plaintiff's case.24 7
Also, because NI-A applies only to suits against owner and licensee of
nursing homes or facilities, under the Tosado approach the NHA
controlled plaintiff s suit.248 Therefore, plaintiff s claim did not need to
follow the mandate of 2-622 of filing a written report and expert
certificate. 24 9 Consequently, certified question answered in the
negative, and cause remanded for further proceedings to the trial
court. 25° Eads v. Heritage Enters, Inc., et aL, No. 4-99-0954, 2001
LEXIS 753, at *1 (11. App. Sept. 26, 2001).

Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Caused By
Exposure to AIDS Is Proper When There Has Been an Actual
Injury
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED), when the emotional distress is
caused by a fear of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), is
properly stated when there has been actual exposure to Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 251 The court further held the exposure
must be through
a "scientifically accepted method of transmission of
252
the virus".
253
Mrs. Shumosky was a nurse who worked for a nursing agency.
While making a home visit for defendant Lutheran Welfare Services
(Lutheran) she stuck her finger with a needle she had used to give the
patient an injection. 254 After the visit was completed, the nurse
discovered the patient was infected with the AIDS virus. 255 After
calling her employer, Bayada Nurses Incorporated (Bayada), Mrs.
247
24

Eads, 2001 LEXIS 753 at *13.

1d. at * 14.

249Id. at *14.
2OId. at *20.

2s'Shumosky v. Lutheran Welfare Services of Northeastern Pa. Inc. and Bayada Nurses
Inc., No.
18 MDA, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2703 at **14 (Pa. Super. October 3, 2001)
252
1d.

2534Id. at *2
2 Id.
2551d.
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Shumosky went to the emergency room at a local hospital where she
was given a Hepatitis B shot, and took a test for HIV.256 The AIDS
patient she had treated died several days later from "ATDS related
257
complications".
Mrs. Shumosky and her husband brought a lawsuit against
Lutheran, alleging it was negligent in failing to inform her that the
patient had AIDS and not supplying her with the proper equipment to
care for the patient.258 Plaintiffs further contended that as a
consequence of Lutheran's negligence, Mrs. Shumosky suffered weight
loss, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, loss of appetite,
nightmares, fear, lack of interest in sexual activity, loss of work for one
year, and an inability to return
to nursing.259 Her husband stated a
260
claim for loss of consortium.
The first issue addressed by the court was whether Lutheran's
grant of summary judgment should be reversed because issues of
material fact existed as to whether a nurse "who sustained a needle
stick with a needle used for an injection of an AIDS patient can state a
claim for physical and emotional injury when she did not develop
AIDS.,, 26 1 The court held that actual exposure to HIV through a
scientifically accepted mode of transmission was required to show
proximate cause of the emotional distress from the fear of being
infected with AIDS 2 62 The court reasoned under the impact rule of
NIED and stated that even a minor injury, such as a needle stick, can be
enough to recover for mental suffering where the physical harm is
directly related to the psychological distress. 263 Therefore, if plaintiffs
could show negligence on the part of Lutheran and proximate cause,
they could recover for the mental anguish that resulted.264
The court next considered the issue of whether Bayada was
contractually obligated to indemnify Lutheran for plaintiffs claims

256Shumosky, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2703 at *2.
2 7Id.

25IM.
9
25
260Id.at *3.
1d.
261
Shumosky, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2703 at *4.
262
Id.at *13-14.
161Id. at *910.
264d. at *10.

CASENOTES

2002]

against it.2 65

The court affirmed the dismissal of the third party
complaint against Bayada.266 The contract provision at issue provided
that Bayada would indemnify Lutheran for claims made by patients
related to the negligence of its employees. 267 The court found the term
failed to sufficiently express Bayada's intent to indemnify Lutheran for
claims made by Bayada employees. 268 The order granting summary
judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further
proceedings and the order sustaining preliminary objections and
dismissing third-party complaint was affirmed.269 Shumosky v.
Lutheran Welfare Services ofNortheasternPa.Inc. and Bayada Nurses
Inc., No. 18 MDA, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXS 2703 (Pa.Super. October3,
2001).

PROCEDURE
Sufficient Minimum Contacts Must Be Proven to Make a Prima
Facie Showing of Personal Jurisdiction Under a Long-Arm Statute
The Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District held a complaint
may be properly dismissed upon a failure to make a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction.270
Patient sought and received monitoring for anticoagulation before,
during, and after a thoracentesis from defendant. 271 Defendant was an
out-of-state resident whose medical practice was entirely out-ofstate.2 72 A corporation domiciled in the same state as plaintiffs,
however, employed defendant. 273 The negligence complained of
occurred entirely out-of-state.2 74 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
265

Shumosky, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2703 at *18.
1d. at* 19-20.

266

2671d. at *19.
268
1d"
269
1d. at *20.
27

°Lindley v. Midwest Pulmonary Consultants, WD 59619 at *6 (Oct. 2, 2001)(2001 Mo.
App. LEXIS 1694).
271
272Id. at *2.
1d.
273
Id.

274Id.
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the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.2 75 Defendant asserted
he was not subject to the jurisdiction of a state court because all of his
services took place out-of-state.2 76 Defendant maintained he lacked
sufficient minimum contacts in-state to satisfy due process
requirements, and did not commit the acts set forth in the state's longarm statute. 277 Plaintiffs argued the state could properly assert
jurisdiction because defendant transacted business in-state, bills for
services issued in-state, payment for services issued in-state, defendant
made deposits
in-state, and defendant was licensed to practice medicine
278

in-state.

The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. 279 On appeal, plaintiffs raised the issue the trial
court erred in deciding defendant lacked sufficient minimum contacts
in-state to meet the standards of due process. 28° Plaintiffs argued
defendant was a physician licensed in-state, was at the relevant times
an employee of an in-state corporation, billed his services in-state, and
payments were made in-state.
The court placed the burden of proving personal jurisdiction on
plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by showing that
the action arose out of an activity covered by the long-arm statute, and
that defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to
2 82 The state long-arm statute required
satisfy due process requirements. 28
transaction of any business within the state, or commission of a tortious
act within the state to establish jurisdiction. 283 The purpose of the
statute was to expand the reach of the law of the state to authorize
jurisdiction over foreign corporations that were not necessarily
authorized to do business in the state but whose activities justify
personal jurisdiction.284

275

276Lindley, WD
2 77

Id.

59619 at *2.

1d.

278
279

28

1d. at * 3-4.
1d. at *1-2.

Lindley, WD 59619 at *5.
1d. at *5-6.
22
1 1d. at *6.
23
1 1d. at *8-9.
284
1d. at *4.
281
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All decisions concerning patient's medical treatment were made
out-of-state. 285 Therefore, the court found plaintiffs failed to make a
prima facie showing that the complained of negligence arose from a
tort committed in-state.286 Further, the court found no facts to connect
defendant's employment by an in-state corporation to decisions made
regarding medical treatment provided to patient.287 The court also
found unconvincing the fact defendant held an in-state medical
license.2 88 Because plaintiffs failed to prove the complaint arose from
activities enumerated in the long-arm statute, the court did find the
need to address whether defendant maintained sufficient minimum
contacts in-state. 289 Therefore, plaintiffs' suit was dismissed for failure
to make a primafacie showing of personal jurisdiction. 290 Lindley v.
Midwest Pulmonary Consultants, WD 59619 (Oct. 2, 2001)(2001 Mo.
App. LEXIS 1694).

As Long As a Physician's Testimony Is Limited to Opinions
Developed During and As Part of Her Treatment of the Subject,
She Will Be Considered a Treating Physician and Not an Expert
For Purposes of FRCP 26(a)(2)
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held testifying about opinions relating to the cause and permanency of a
patient's condition does not convert the treating physician into a
retained expert for purposes of FRCP 26(a)(2) if the testimony is
limited to opinions developed during and as part of treatment of the
patient. 291 Dr. Romero treated plaintiff in connection with unspecified
injuries.
At trial, plaintiff identified Romero as a treating physician but did
not provide an expert report from Romero pursuant to Federal Rules of
WD
2''Lindley,
286

Id. at *10.
27
' 1d. at *15.

59619 at *9-10.

28'Id.

2'91d. at *20-21.
2
"Lindley,
29

WD 59619 at *6.
Zurba v. United States, No. 99 C 3586, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14861 at *3 (N.D. Ill.

Sept. 17 2001).
22d.at

*1.
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Civil Procedure.293 Prior to trial, plaintiffs attorney sent defendant's
attorney a letter stating Romero would offer opinion testimony based
on his treatment of plaintiff and concerning the cause and permanency
294
of her condition.
Defendant filed a motion in limine to bar treating physicians from
offering expert testimony.295 Defendant argues since plaintiff did not
submit a report from Dr. Romero, the Court should bar him from
testifying on matters that exceed his own personal observations made
during the course of treatment, such as issues of causation,
permanency
296
of injury, disability, and future pain and suffering.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require, with respect to a
witness who is retained to provide expert testimony, the disclosure of a
report containing, inter alia, a statement of all opinions, data, exhibits,
qualifications, and compensation.297 This rule applies only to experts
retained to provide expert testimony. 298 A treating physician is not
considered a retained expert if his testimony is based on observations
made during the course of treatment, the testimony was not acquired in
anticipation of litigation, and the testimony is based on personal
knowledge.299
The fact that a physician proposes to give an opinion regarding the
causation and permanency of his patient's injury does not itself make
him a retained expert, so long as such opinions are developed during
and as part of the treatment. 30 0 Therefore, defendant's motion in limine
to bar treating physicians from offering expert testimony was denied.30 '
Zurba v. United States, No. 99 C 3586, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXS 14861,
at *1 (N.D. Il. Sept. 17 2001).
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Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying a New Trial Where
Statute Does Not Require a Timely Filed Affidavit, No
Nondisclosure Occurred During Voir Dire, and No Medical
Expertise Was Needed to Comprehend Jury Instructions
The Court of Appeals of Missouri, Southern District, Division One
held: (1) state statute does not require the timely filing of an affidavit to
properly establish subject matter jurisdiction where it is undisputed that
the cause of action falls within the scope of the court's authority; (2) no
nondisclosure of any kind occurred during voir dire; and
(3) no medical
30 2
instructions.
jury
comprehend
to
needed
was
expertise
Plaintiffs son suffered an asthma attack and died after being
transported to hospital by defendant. 30 3 En route to the hospital,
defendant's Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) determined
decedent was critically ill and required an advanced life-support
ambulance. 30 4 It took approximately fifteen to twenty minutes for
30 5
decedent to be switched to the advanced life-support ambulance.
Two days after arriving at the hospital, decedent died.30 6
A jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded $1,000,000, later
reduced, in damages. 30 7 Both defendant and plaintiff appealed the
ruling of the trial court.
First, defendant raised five issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when plaintiff failed to timely
file an affidavit required by statute; (2) whether a new trial was proper
because a juror failed to make disclosures in voir dire; (3) whether
damage definitions prejudiced the jury; (4) whether jurors need medical
expertise to comprehend jury instructions; and (5) whether plaintiffs
expert witness was qualified to testify concerning the standard of

302

Burns v. Elk River Ambulance, Inc., Nos. 23656 & 23738 at * 1 (Sept. 18,
2001)(2001
303 Mo. App. LEXIS 1625).
1d.at *2.
3041d"
35

" 1d. at *3.

307

Burns, Nos. 23656 & 23738 at *3.
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care. 30 8 The court found that defendant failed
to show any alleged error
309
case.
the
of
outcome
the
affected
materially
Plaintiff also raised five issues on appeal.310 Plaintiffs points of
contention were based upon failure to admit evidence, misapplication
of state statute regarding noneconomic damages, and constitutionality
of state statutes concerning non-economic damages. 311 The court also
found plaintiffs arguments unconvincing and affirmed the trial
court.312 Burns v. Elk River Ambulance, Inc., Nos. 23656 & 23738
(Sept. 18, 2001)(2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 1625).

If a Plaintiff Knows That There Is a Potential For Medical
Negligence Against an Unnamed Physician Her Claim Is Still
Timely If the Initial Defendant Raises a Comparative Fault
Defense Implicating That Unnamed Physician
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section, at Nashville held
that a plaintiff has 90 days to file her complaint when a defendant
implicates another potential defendant by invoking a defense of
comparative fault even when the plaintiff
knows of the potential for
313
that subsequent defendant's negligence.
On July 20, 1995, Plaintiff/Appellant (plaintiff) went to Sumner
Regional Medical Center (hospital) complaining of a backache and
315
irregular contractions. 314 After being observed
with a fetal monitor,
plaintiff was discharged by her physician. 3 1 Two days later, on July
22, 1995, plaintiff returned to the hospital.316 This time however, in
addition to the backache and irregular contractions plaintiff was
complaining of abdominal pain. 317 As an "emergency out-patient" she
3

08 Bums, Nos. 23656 & 23738 at *4, 9, 13-4, 22, 26.

39
1 1d.
31

at* 27.

Od.

311

1d. at *28-9, 34, 38, 42-3, 48.
at *49.
Durbin v. Sumner County Reg'l Health Sys., No. M2000-02109-COA-R3-CV, 2001
Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept 6, 2001).
312
Id.
313

314

1d.

3 15
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was observed once more with the fetal monitor.3 1 8 Plaintiff underwent
an ultrasound because her physician suspected that kidney stones were
the cause of her discomfort. 3 19 The physician prescribed plaintiff pain
relievers and instructed her to maintain bed rest with bathroom
privileges. 320 On July 26, 1995, plaintiff returned for a scheduled
appointment with her physician and was told after fetal heart
monitoring that the twins were lifeless. 321 It was later determined that
the twins died of Twin to Twin Transfusion Syndrome (TTS).322
On July 12, 1996, plaintiff filed suit in state court against the
Hospital and several physicians, with the notable exception of the
physician.323 The hospital cited the actions of the physician as a part of
their defense of comparative fault.324 On February 11, 1997, plaintiff
moved to include the physician as a defendant. 32 5 The physician then
moved to dismiss the amended complaint.326 Both the hospital and
plaintiff opposed the physician's motion. 327 A jury found for both the
hospital and physician. 328 The trial court then held that the plaintiffs
claims against the physician were untimely. 329 The plaintiffs appeal
challenges the post trial dismissal of the physician, the jury decision as
being against the manifest weight of the evidence, procedural error that
resulted in prejudice, and inadequate jury instructions.33 °
The first issue that the court dealt with was whether the post trial
dismissal of the physician was proper.331 The court held that the
dismissal was improper and reversed the trial courts decision. 332 The
court reasoned that the parents had 90 days to add the physician after
the hospital added the defense of comparative fault. 333 The court
31

Durbin, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 at *2.

319
1d. at
320

*2-3.
1d. at *3.

32 1
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322id.
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325Id
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1d. at *5.
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1d.
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Durbin, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 at *5.
1d

"

at passim.
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1d. at *13.
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further explained that the plaintiffs knowledge of the physician's
potential for liability does not affect the timeliness of their claim.33 4
The court affirmed the rest of the issues on appeal.335 The court held
that there was "ample evidence" to support the jury's verdict, therefore
it could not overturn their decision on appeal.
Durbin v. Sumner
County Reg'l Health Sys., No. M2000-02109-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 660, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept 6, 2001).

When a Cause of Action Stems from a State Law that Does Not
Make Reference To and Acts Irrespective of ERISA it is Not
Federally Preempted
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held that state claims of negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, and
breach of contract were not preempted by ERISA.337
Plaintiff, Guardian Rehabilitation Hospital is a health care facility
that provides rehabilitation and skilled nursing services to its
patients. 338 Defendant, Electrical Workers Health and Benefit Plan for
Contra Costa County (Defendant) provides health care benefits to its
members. 339
Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that defendant
represented to them that coverage was available and subsequently
rendered services to a member of defendant's plan for which plaintiff
has yet to be paid.34°
Plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court of California in the County of
Contra Costa alleging causes of action for negligent misrepresentation,
estoppel, and breach of contract. 34 1 Defendant then filed for removal to
federal court claiming that the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) preempts any state law claims and is subject to the
3 34

335

Durbin,2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 at *12.

1d. at

336

*13-42.

1d. at *16.
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Ocadian Care Centers, Inc. v. Elec. Workers Health and Welfare Plan for Contra

Costa County, No. C 01-00790 MEJ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241 at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6,
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1d. at *2.
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exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 342 Plaintiff then moved to
remand the case to state court because the federal court lacks
jurisdiction, since state claims of negligent misrepresentation, estoppel,
and breach of contract are all independent of ERISA.34 3 After answers
and repies to one another's motions the district court heard the
matter.344
The district court held that the state claims of negligent
misrepresentation, estoppel, and breach of contract are independent of
ERISA and the matter should be remanded to the state court.3 45 The
court reasoned that since the state laws "make no reference to and
346
function irrespective of' ERISA they are independent claims.
Plaintiffs motion was granted and the independent state law claims
were remanded to the state court.3 4 7 Ocadian Care Centers, Inc. v.
Elec. Workers Health and Welfare Planfor Contra Costa County, No.
C 01-00790 MEJ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXS 14241 at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

6, 2001).

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
A Father Need Only Make Reasonable Efforts to Contribute to
Medical and Pregnancy Related Expenses When Specifically
Requested By Mother
The Court of Appeals of Utah held Utah's Adoption Statute requires,
inter alia, a father to agree to be legally responsible for expenses
related to pregnancy and birth, and upon specific request by the mother,
that the father make reasonable efforts to contribute to medical and
pregnancy related expenses. 348

342

OcadianCare Centers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241 at *2-3.
1431d. at *3.
44Id. at *passim.
45

1d. at *9.

3461d.

3470cadian Care Centers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241 at

*10-11.

the Matter of the Adoption of B.V., S.H. v. W.V. No. 20000449-CA, 2001 UT
App. LEXIS 75, at *1 (Ct. App Utah, Oct. 4,2001).
34Sn
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Mother became impregnated by Father.349 Within five months,
their relationship had ended. 350 Throughout the pregnancy, Father
purchased childcare supplies, clothing and toys, which he kept at his
residence. 35 1 At least monthly until child's birth, Father unsuccessfully
attempted to contact Mother by phone. 35 2 On the day after child's birth,
Mother relinquished parental rights and consented to child's
adoption.353
Father filed a motion to enjoin and dismiss the adoption arguing
he complied with the Adoption Statute and therefore the adoptive
parents were required to obtain his consent prior to adoption. 354 Trial
court found that Father failed to pay fair and reasonable expenses
incurred in connection with pregnancy and birth, but made only token
contributions. 355 The trial court refused to credit Father's purchases of
the childcare items he kept at his residence because he did not make
them available to Mother, and therefore terminated his parental
rights.356 Father appealed.357
State statute provided a father must pay a fair and reasonable
amount of pregnancy and birth related expenses, in accordance with his
means.358 An unwed biological father must strictly comply with the
statutory conditions or he will be deemed to have waived and
surrendered any right in relation to the child.359 In interpreting the
statute the trial court improperly focused on what Father actually
paid.36°
Father attempted to pay a reasonable share of medical expenses,
but Mother failed to provided him with specific information regarding
those expenses. 36 1 Therefore, the trial court erred in finding Father in
349

B.V, 2001 UT App. LEXIS 75 at *1.

301d. at *3.
351

1d.
1d.
353
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1d. at *4.

354B. V, 2001 UT App. LEXIS 75 at *4.
35
5

1d.

356
3 57

Id"

Id.
358
1d. at
359

*7.
B. V, 2001 UT App. LEXIS 75 at *9.

36 0

1d.

361

1d. at *13.

2002]

CASENOTES

non-compliance with statutory requirement. 362 In the Matter of the
Adoption of B. V., S.H. v. W. V No. 20000449-CA, 2001 UT App.
LEXIS 75, at **1 (Ct. App Utah, Oct. 4, 2001).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A Wrongful Death Action May Be Dismissed For Untimely Filing
The Court of Appeals of Oregon held dismissal of plaintiffs wrongful
death action
constitutional under Oregon Constitution for untimely
63
filing.

3

Plaintiff filed action against a physician more than seven years
after the treatment she alleged caused her husband's death.364 ORS
12.110(4) states that an action to recover damages arising from medical
treatment should be commenced within two years from the date when
the injury is first discovered.365 However, every such action should be
commenced within five years from the date of the treatment which the
action is based.366
Plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing her wrongful death
action on the ground that it was barred by the ultimate repose provision
of the ORS 12.110(4). 367 Plaintiff alleged that ORS 12.110(4) was
unconstitutional because it granted privileges to a certain class of
individuals that is not available to all on equal terms, and that the
disparate treatment lacked a rational basis. 368 The defendant responds
that any distinction drawn by ORS 12.110(4) is not based on
any "true
369
basis.
rational
a
has
distinction
any
events,
all
in
class," and
The court held plaintiffs class, long latency period malpractice
victims, was not a true class. 370 They reasoned that since long latency
362

B. V, 2001 UT App. LEXIS 75 at *21.
363Barke v. Maeyens, No. A111121, 2001 Ore. App. LEXIS 1404 at *1 (Ore. App. Sept.
12,2001).
364Id
365
3661d"
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3671rd.
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period malpractice victims were a sub class of the general group of
medical malpractice plaintiffs who were treated identically under ORS
12.110(4), the class could not stand on its own. 37 1 The court also held
the repose revision constitutional.372 They reasoned that since it did not
undermine the court's statements that there was no common-law action
for wrongful death, it could not have been a claim based on an absolute
right that existed when the Oregon Constitution was adopted.373
Therefore, wrongful death claims were not protected by the Oregon
constitution, and legislatively excluded.374 Also, even if the plaintiffs
action did exist at the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted, it
would have been subject to the statute of limitations that embodied a
repose provision not unlike the one in ORS 12.110(4). 375
The Court of Appeals held ORS 12.110(4) constitutional as
applied to plaintiff and affirmed the trial court. 37 6 Barke v. Maeyens,
No. A111121, 2001 Ore. App. LEXIS 1404 at 'I (Ore. App. Sept. 12,
2001).

Untimely Filing of an Expert Report May Result In Dismissal of
the Action When the Grace Period Request Does Not Show the
Delay Was Not Intentional Nor the Result of Conscious
Indifference
The Court of Appeals of Texas held the dismissal orders for the grace
period filed by the plaintiff proper since plaintiff failed to establish the
untimely filing of the expert report was not intentional or the result of
conscious indifference. 37 '
Plaintiff underwent surgery at the hospital and returned two days
later where the physician treated and released her. 378 Six days later, she
was readmitted for suffering a complete transection of the hepatic duct
71 Barke, 2001 Ore. App. LEXIS 1404 at *12.
2

17 1d. at
373

*18.
Td. at * 16-17.
374
3751d. at *17.
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376
Barke, 2001 Ore. App. LEXIS 1404 at *22.
377
Marquez v. Vigil, No. 08-00-00268-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6558 at *1 (Tex.
App. Sept.
27,2001).
378
1d.

CASENOTES

2002]

during surgery resulting in peritonitis and septic379shock. Plaintiff
underwent emergency surgery to repair the damage.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against the surgeon, and
then amended her complaint to include the hospital, the physician, and
the corporation. 380 She did not file the required expert report until 202
days after she amended her complaint. 38 1 After defendant filed a
motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed an unverified motion for a 30-day
grace period in which to file the report. 38 2 Plaintiff offered her
attorney's testimony in order to show that untimely filing was due to
Attorney's testimony, however, was
accident or mistake. 383
inconsistent with the facts. 384 This was the only sworn testimony
plaintiff offered, but her attorney clarified his testimony at the trial for
the motion to dismiss and stated that the expert report was not timely
filed because of accident or mistake. 385 The trial court found plaintiff s
motion untimely pursuant to Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i,
§13.01(g), dismissed plaintiffs suit and awarded defendant attorney's
fees and costs.386 Plaintiff appealed.387
Since an expert report need not be verified, plaintiff s motion was
not untimely for that reason. 388 However, even though opponents did
not object to the plaintiffs lawyer's testimony at trial, the court held
that the testimony was inadmissible. 389 The court reasoned that the
opponents did not know or should not have known that an objection
was necessary since the proponent did not preface his remarks by
stating he was making them as an officer of the court, nor did he refer
to his argument as testimony. 390 Since plaintiff provided inconsistent
sworn testimony and inadmissible unswom testimony, she did not
sufficiently show delay was caused by accident or mistake to invoke
379

Marquez, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6558 at *1.
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the grace period. 391 Thus, the court held the expert report was untimely
filed.392 Secondly, the court held that the Texas Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA) was constitutional as applied to
393
plaintiff and held the MLIIA did not restrict her access to the courts.
The court reasoned that although medical negligence was a recognized
common law claim, plaintiff did not satisfy her burden of showing the
MLIIA was unreasonable or arbitrary since she did not produce any
evidence that the requirements of the MLIIA worked to prevent her
from pursuing her claim.3 9 4 Third, the court held the sanctions imposed
on plaintiff did not violate her right to due process.3 95 They reasoned
that because sanctions were imposed on plaintiff only after she took
advantage of only one of the three possible methods Section 13.01
provided for obtaining an extension of time, there was no violation of
due process rights. 396 Fourth, the court also held that there was no
abuse of discretion when awarding defendant attorney's fees and costs,
since the affidavits of the defendants sufficiently addressed the relevant
factors listed in Rule 1.04(b). 397 The court refused to address the issue
of whether the defendants waived their right to seek dismissal and the
issue of whether one of the defendants may not obtain dismissal of suit
because he is not a healthcare provider. 398 The court reasoned that
since plaintiff did not support399her arguments by citing authority, she
waived review of these issues.
The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal orders. 400 Marquez v.
Vigil, No. 08-00-00268-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXJS 6558 at *1 (Tex.
App. Sept. 27, 2001).
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A Court May Not Give Retroactive Effect to Newly Enacted
Statutes of Limitations Thereby Shortening the Period Within
Which a Claim Arising Prior to Enactment Must be Brought
The First Judicial District of Hinds County Circuit Court, Mississippi
held a court may not give retroactive effect to newly enacted statutes of
limitations thereby shortening the period within which a claim arising
prior to enactment must be brought.4 °1
Defendant Al-Mefty performed brain surgery on plaintiff Bailey
on July 26, 1990.402 Over the next several years, Bailey experienced a
series of adverse symptoms. 40 3 On April 5, 1995, Bailey was informed
that the first surgery had been unsuccessful
and subsequently
404
underwent a second, albeit different, procedure.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that the first surgery
was negligently performed due to defendant's failure to employ proper
medical knowledge and skill.40 5 Defendant moved for summary
judgment asserting plaintiff failed to file his claims within the
applicable statute of limitations set forth under the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act (MTCA).4 6 Plaintiffs answer alleged that MTCA did not
apply to his claims since they arose out of an incident occurring before
passage of MTCA. 40 7 The trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment.40 Plaintiff appealed.40 9
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent
of the legislature from the statute as a whole and from the language
used therein.4 10 The language of MTCA clearly states the statute is to
apply to actions occurring after April 1, 1993.411 The surgery in
401

Bailey v. A1-Mefty, No. 1999-CA-01635-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 229 at *1 (Sup. Ct.
Miss. Sept.
13, 2001).
402
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question occurred in 1990.412 Thus, MTCA does not apply and the
general medical malpractice statute controls, leaving plaintiff two years
during which to timely file suit.413 The trial court therefore erred in
holding MTCA applicable. 414 Bailey v. Al-Mefty, No. 1999-CA -01635SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXS 229, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Miss. Sept. 13, 2001).

WORKERS COMPENSATION
Employee May Recover For Mental Injuries Under Workers
Compensation When Caused By a Specific Physical Injury
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, Eastern Section held that an
employee could recover for mental injuries
when the mental harm was
4 15
injury.
physical
specific
a
caused by
Appellant Crabtree had worked for Appellee for eighteen years
when he was suddenly transferred to a more physically demanding job
within plant. 416 Shortly thereafter appellant was moving a heavy box
and' felt a pain in his back.417 He reported to the personnel department
and was referred to a physician. 418 The physician allowed him to return
to work the next day but ordered him assigned to light duty.4 1 9
Appellant's supervisor started assigning him to work overtime on
Saturdays and when the physician wrote a note objecting to the
Saturday overtime, appellant was told he would have to work extra
hours during the week.42 ° Consequently the physician wrote a note
stating appellant was not to work more than forty hours a week, at
which point appellant was transferred to the welding division. 421 His
position in the welding division placed a great deal of strain on
412 Bailey, 2001

Miss. LEXIS 229 at *11.
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appellant's back and the physician wrote another note stressing the
importance of light duty work. 22 Appellant was referred to an
orthopedic surgeon who, determining there was no permanent injury,
prescribed physical therapy, kept him on light duty for several months
but then allowed him to return to his regular position.423 He continued
to suffer from pain but was denied further medical treatment. 424 During
this time appellant's mental wellbeing began to deteriorate and he
suffered from anxiety and depression. 42 5 Appellee filed suit against
appellant42 petitioning
the court to exonerate the corporation from
6
liability.
The issue before the court was whether the trial court properly
awarded compensation to appellant for his mental injuries. 427 The court
held these injuries were compensable because there was sufficient
causal connection between the physical and mental injuries. 428 To
recover under workers compensation in Tennessee the employee must
first show an "injury by accident" that arose during the course of
employment.42 9 Mental harm is compensable when the "injury by
accident" is linked to the psychiatric injury. 430 There was testimony
that the depression and anxiety suffered by appellant were linked to his
feelings of inadequacy and fear of not being able to provide for his
family.431 The trial court found these feelings arose directly out of the
harassment he was receiving at work and his physical injury. 432 The
trial court pointed to appellant's eighteen-year work history without
psychiatric illness in support of this finding.43 3 On appeal this court did
not find this determination to be in error.4 34 The findings of the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel were rejected and the decision
4 2
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of the trial court was affirmed.435 Cutler-Hammer v. Crabtree, No.
E1998-00845-SC-WCM-CV, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. September
7, 2001).

WRONGFUL DEATH
A Wrongful Death Action May Be Dismissed When There Is No
Showing of Causation
The United States District Court of the District of Massachusetts held
that plaintiff could not show causation under regular standards as well
as under the theory of alternative liability for her wrongful death
43 6
action.
Plaintiffs' daughter, a hemophiliac, contracted the HIV virus from
a blood transfusion and later died from her contraction of HIV. 43
Plaintiffs' daughter was treated with factor VIII concentrate
manufactured by Alpha and Baxter, but parties dispute whether she
43S
may have received factor VIII concentrate from other manufacturers.
Medical records traced back to Alpha and Baxter, but the records also
failed to identify a manufacturer for many other doses. 439 Plaintiffs
filed action against Alpha and Baxter, and defendants moved for
440
summary judgment.
The court held that plaintiffs did not satisfy causation under
regular standards. They reasoned that since plaintiffs did not claim that
they could trace the infection to either Alpha or Baxter alone, they did
not establish as trialworthy the proposition that it was more probable
than not that an individual defendant was responsible for the death.441
The court also held that plaintiffs did not show causation under the

435
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theory of alternative liability.442 They reasoned that since plaintiffs'
facts could not demonstrate three of the four requirements, they could
not satisfy their burden of showing alternative liability. 443 Furthermore,
even if they could have shown alternative liability, this was a theory
and not Massachusetts law. 444
The court held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to
demonstrate causation, and granted summary judgment for the
defendants. 445 Spencer v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., Civil Action No. 97-CV12480-RCL, 2001 U.S. Dist.LEXS 15809 (US. Dist.Sept. 28, 2001).
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